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This paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax
avoidance. When investing in tax avoidance is possible, the oﬃcial tax rate
does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay in taxes.
This aﬀects both redistributive outcomes as well as individual’s political at-
titudes towards taxation. Depending on the avoidance technology diﬀerent
political equilibria emerge. When the tax avoidance possibilities are limited,
the classical conﬂict between rich and poor is sustained. If the tax avoidance
technology is more eﬀective, however, the equilibrium outcome can change to
a situation characterized by a coalition of poor and the very richest favoring
a higher tax rate. When comparing the model’s predictions with data on in-
come inequality and evidence of avoidance activity it comes surprisingly close
to actual observations.
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1 Introduction
Redistributive policies are central elements of any democratic government’s activ-
ities. Decisions about such policies have a common structure: members of society
determine the size of taxes and transfers in a democratic process; decisions which
are then presumed to be followed by everyone. This paper studies what happens
in such a society if individuals have the possibility to invest in avoiding taxation,
while still beneﬁtting from the transfers? How does this change the possibilities to
tax individuals and to redistribute income? How does tax avoidance change the
income distribution in society? How does it aﬀect people’s political attitudes and,
ultimately, the political equilibrium? These are questions that this paper sets out
to answer.
There are several reasons for studying these questions. First of all, tax avoid-
ance activities are empirically important. Among the many possible responses to
taxation, there is a lot of evidence suggesting that people do engage in a wide va-
riety of activities where the only purpose is to lower the individual tax burden. In
quantitative terms, measures of the size of tax avoidance vary in the range of two
to seven percent of GDP, depending on how it is deﬁned and how it is estimated.1
In relation to other behavioral responses, the various tax avoidance activities are
signiﬁcant and, in particular, they seem to be more important than labor supply
responses for the elasticity of the tax base.2 This is an important observation, since
decisions on labor supply are often the corner-stone in political-economic models of
redistribution (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000) for an overview of this litera-
ture).
Second, the eﬀects of tax avoidance on redistributive policies seem to be of
particular interest. As noted by Gunnar Myrdal (1978) in a comment about the
Swedish tax system, the incentives for high income earners to exploit various tax
1Gordon and Nielsen (1997), Nielsen et al. (2001) and Löfqvist (2001) obtain estimates for
Denmark and Sweden, respectively, suggesting that between 4 and 6 percent of total income is
avoided (2-4 percent of GDP). Andreoni, Erard and Feinstien (1998) report estimates for the US
which suggest that about 20 percent of taxes owed are not paid. This is approximately 2 percent
of GDP. At the high end of the estimates, Lang et. al. ﬁnd a tax gap for Germany in 1983, which
is 34 percent, corresponding to about seven percent of GDP.
2E.g. Slemrod (1992), Feldstein (1995), Agell, Englund and Södersten (1996), and Auerbach
and Slemrod (1997).3
avoidance schemes can modify the tax system so that it no longer redistributes
income. The reason for this could be that high-income earners often can choose
tax favored forms of income or savings to a larger extent than others, but it could
also be due to ﬁxed-costs in tax avoidance activities.3 For example, hiring a tax
consultant to ﬁle one’s tax return may only be proﬁtable if one has a suﬃciently
high income.
Third, if tax avoidance can change the redistributive properties of a tax system,
this may also have political consequences. If rich individuals manage to avoid suf-
ﬁciently large shares of their taxes, it is no longer obvious that they oppose high
tax rates. A rich person who knows that he optimally will choose to invest in tax
avoidance will vote accordingly. In the extreme situation where a rich individual
can shelter all of his income, he will vote like a person who has no income. After
all, what determines an individual’s preferences over alternative tax rates is not her
income, per se, but rather, her taxable income.
This paper develops a simple model of redistributive politics where individuals
diﬀer in endowed income. These individuals face two decisions. First, they choose
how to vote in a majority rule election, which determines the tax rate. The tax is
assumed to be proportional, and the tax revenue goes to lump-sum redistribution.
Second, before taxes are paid and transfers received, individuals decide whether to
invest in tax avoidance. The eﬀects of these decisions (individual and aggregate)
are, of course, taken into account at the time of the vote.
The investment in tax avoidance is assumed to be a binary choice under cer-
tainty, where a ﬁxed cost enables an individual to avoid a known share of his tax
payment. Hence, the focus is on legal tax avoidance, as oppose to illegal tax eva-
sion.4 Diﬀerent combinations of the cost and the share avoided can be considered as
capturing diﬀerent forms of tax avoidance activities. For example, a low cost leading
3See e.g. Agell and Persson (2000) for references.
4The analysis would obviously be the same even though the activity was illegal, as long the risk
of being caught was zero. The distinction between legal (avoidance) and illegal (evasion) activities
is, hence, not central to the interpretation of tax avoidance in this paper. What is central is that
tax avoidance is a choice under certainty.I nt h i ss e n s e ,i ti sc l o s et ot h ef o r m u l a t i o n si nM a y s h a r
(1991) and Slemrod (2001). See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) for a more detailed discussion.4
to a relatively small tax reduction approximates small-scale tax planning (standard
legal advice or private time costs). High costs leading to large reductions instead
approximate advanced schemes, such as the use of tax havens. In the basic set up
of the model, only one avoidance option is available at a time. But a more complete
speciﬁcation permits both small scale and complete tax avoidance.
The problem of ﬁnding a political equilibrium turns out to be complicated. The
tax avoidance opportunities imply that individual preferences are neither single-
peaked, nor order-restricted, for the general problem. Rather than restricting the
problem to apply to the median voter theorem, a numerical method for solving the
problem is developed.
The results turn out to depend on the tax avoidance technology. When avoidance
possibilities are limited, the equilibrium tax rate is typically high and the political
conﬂict between the rich and the poor remains. In equilibrium, high income earners
thus prefer lower taxes, and low income earners favor higher taxes. However, as tax
avoidance becomes less expensive (or more eﬀective), the equilibrium tax rate goes
down, and tax avoidance starts to alter the traditional division of attitudes toward
tax changes. In the extreme case, where taxes can be completely avoided, support
for a further increase of the tax rate, at the equilibrium, comes from an unusual
coalition of voters. The poor favor an increase because their income is low, and
the rich favor it because their taxable income is zero, due to their tax avoidance
investments. When the model is solved for a range of reasonable parameters the
model seems to give surprisingly accurate predictions, when compared to data.
This paper attempts to bridge two strands of literature. The ﬁrst is the work in
political economics concerned with general redistributive programs, following Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) (see Persson and Tabellini
(2000) for a comprehensive survey of this literature). As noted above, much of
this literature assumes that the relevant response to taxation is changes in labor
supply, and therefore focuses on the interaction between voting and labor supply. In
contrast, this paper - in light of the empirical ﬁnding that tax avoidance seems more5
important than labor supply responses - instead studies the interaction between
voting and tax avoidance. The second strand of literature is the work in public
economics on tax avoidance (see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) for an overview).
Here, several papers stress diﬀerent forms of tax avoidance and the interplay between
avoidance and labor supply decisions (such as Mayshar (1991), Agell and Persson
(2000) and Slemrod (2001). None of these papers, however, consider the endogenous,
democratic choice of the tax rate, which is a key aspect in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and shows
how tax avoidance has an impact on the size of transfers and how it aﬀects individual
preferences over tax rates. In Section 3, the problems with the non-applicability of
the median voter theorems are discussed, and the numerical method for ﬁnding the
political equilibrium is outlined. In Section 4, the model is solved and in Section 5
the model’s predictions are confronted with data. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
The economy considered here is populated by a continuum of individuals assumed
to have identical increasing and concave utility functions over consumption, u(c).
Individuals diﬀer in endowed income, w, which is distributed according to a contin-
uously diﬀerentiable c.d.f., Φ(w), with support [0,∞), and for each positive level of
w, there is a positive density given by ϕ(w)=Φ0(w). The population is normal-




0 wϕ(w)dw. The median income, wm, is assumed to be lower than the mean
income, i.e. wm <
_
w.
Ap r o p o r t i o n a lt a x ,t ∈ (0,1], is used to ﬁnance a lump-sum transfer of r units of
consumption, which is received by everyone. However, individuals can avoid paying
as h a r e(1− δ), δ ∈ [0,1], of the tax, through investing a lump-sum A ∈ [0,+∞) in
tax avoidance. This means that if an individual, with income w, invests A,h ew i l l
only pay δwt in taxes, rather than the full, oﬃcial amount wt. This binary formu-
lation of the tax avoidance is chosen partly to simplify the analysis, but also since6
many real-life avoidance activities involve such ﬁxed-cost investments. Furthermore,
this formulation covers a large number of functional forms where the amount avoided
is an increasing function of how much is invested in tax avoidance.5 The option to
make this investment is available to everyone, and the parameters describing the
tax avoidance technology, (A,δ), are assumed to be exogenously given.6 Diﬀerent
combinations of A and δ can be thought of as representing diﬀerent forms of avoid-
ance activities. For instance, a combination of a low value of A and a high value of
δ represent small-scale tax planning which has a relatively low cost, but is also rel-
atively ineﬃcient (standard accounting advice or private time-costs). The opposite
combination of a high value of A and a low value of δ implies costly but eﬃcient tax
avoidance (advanced tax planning).7
2.1 Individual decisions
Individuals in this economy face two decisions. A political decision of how to vote in
the majority election that determines the tax rate, and a binary choice of investing
or not investing in tax avoidance. These decisions are obviously linked since the
individual choice of whether to invest in tax avoidance depends on the tax rate, just
as an individual’s choice of how to vote, depends on whether he will choose to avoid
taxes. Assuming that the avoidance decision can be taken at any point in time,
while the election date is ﬁxed, implies that it is made in response to the election
5If the proportion of taxes avoided δ was a function of the amount invested A, the optimal
investments would correspond to the binary choice formulation used here for all functions that
exhibit increasing returns to scale. More precisely, if the problem is to maximize u((1−δ(A)t)w+
r − A) w.r.t. A,w i t hδ
0(A) < 0, this has a f.o.c, −δ
0(A)tw − 1, implying that an interior solution
is implicitly given by −δ
0(A)= 1
tw, only if δ
00(A) > 0. If δ
00(A) ≤ 0, that is, if there are increasing
returns to avoidance, only corner solutions can be optimal. Hence, the formulation with avoidance
being a binary choice covers all cases with increasing returns to tax avoidance investments.
6It could of course be argued that δ also should be endogenous, since it is a matter of tax design
to determine how much avoidance is allowed. This would, however, create a multi-dimensional
setting, complicating the analysis of political equilibria. Furthermore, loop-holes and unintended
(but still legal) tax deductions seem to be an inate feature of any tax system, see e.g. Shackelford
(2000).
7In sections two and three, only one avoidance possibility will be available at a time (either
al o wA and a high δ, or vice versa). However, in sections four and ﬁve, there will be both less
expensive and less eﬃcient, as well as costly, advanced forms of avoidance available simultaneously.7
outcome.8
Given this sequence, the optimal avoidance decision is simple. For any given tax
rate, an individual chooses to invest in tax avoidance if that choice results in higher
utility than paying full taxes, that is if
u(w − δtw + r − A) >u (w − tw + r) .
The critical income, w∗, follows directly from the indiﬀerence condition
w
∗ − A − δtw









T h i sm e a n st h a ta ta n yt a xr a t e ,t h e r ei sau n i q u ei n c o m e ,w∗, which splits the
population into two parts. Those with an income below w∗ pay full taxes, while
those with a higher income choose to avoid a share δ of their tax payment. From
(1), we see that w∗ is increasing in A and in δ, while it is decreasing in t.T h i s
means that the more expensive is tax avoidance, (the higher is A), and the less
the investment reduces taxes, (the higher is δ), the higher must the individual’s
income be for tax avoidance to be proﬁtable. Similarly, the higher the tax rate,
the smaller is the critical income for choosing to avoid taxes. Individuals with
w<A / (1 − δ) will, however, never ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in tax avoidance.
Formally, w∗ ∈ [ A
(1−δ),+∞) and ∂w∗
∂t < 0.
An individual’s preferences over tax rates depend on whether or not he avoids
taxes. For an individual with income w, the induced utility function, v, can be
8If the order were reversed, so that the avoidance decision had to be taken before the election,
and could not be changed afterwards, a problem similar to the so-called “capital levy problem” in
the capital taxation literature would emerge (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1994b)). There would
be no ex post possibility to escape taxation and in the absence of a commitment mechanism, no
tax rate other than t =1would be credible. Anticipating this, everyone optimally choosing to
invest in avoidance at this tax rate would do so before the election.8
written as
v(w,t ;A,δ)=m a x
½
u(w − tw + r)
u(w − A − δtw + r)
if w ≤ w∗
if w > w∗
, (2)
where w∗ is given by (1) and r is the transfer. Since the transfer is a function of the
tax rate, the relevant derivatives are given by
dv(·)
dt













respectively. These equations give the relevant ﬁrst-order conditions for individuals
who at tax rate t pay taxes in full, given by (3), as well as the ﬁrst-order conditions
for those who at t optimally invests in tax avoidance and only pays part of his taxes,
given by (3). Individual utility is, hence, well deﬁned and continuous over all tax
rates, but can be kinked at the point t = A/(1 − δ)w.
2.2 Budget balance
Individual tax avoidance decisions aﬀect redistribution. Requiring the budget to









which can be simpliﬁed to
r(t)=t[δ
_




The transfer function is a continuous function r :[ 0 ,1] → R+ with limt→0 r(t)=0
and r(1) = δ
_





w. The interpretation of equation (6) is
that everyone, including tax avoiders, pay tδw, while those with an income below9
w∗, also pay an additional amount, t(1−δ)w. Thus, increasing the tax rate has two
opposing eﬀects on the size of the transfer. On the one hand, there is a positive
eﬀect on tδ
R w∗(t)
0 wϕ(w)dw while, on the other, as t goes up, w∗goes down, i.e. more
people choose to avoid tax and hence, the share of individuals paying full taxes goes






















From (7), we see that the marginal eﬀect on the transfer function is composed of
three parts. The ﬁrst part, δ
_
w, is a positive constant capturing the fact that everyone
pays at least a share δ of the taxes, regardless of the tax rate. The second part,
(1 − δ)
R w∗(t)
0 wϕ(w)dw, is positive and strictly decreasing in t, since the fraction of
the population paying full taxes is strictly decreasing in the tax rate. The third
part, −A
t w∗ϕ(w∗), captures the negative marginal eﬀect of individuals shifting from
paying full taxes to avoiding tax. The aggregate impact on the size of redistribution
is ambiguous and depends on the relative size of these eﬀects.
From equation (8), we can see that a formal condition for r(t) to be concave
is that ϕ(w∗)+w∗ϕ0(w∗) < 0.9 However, there is no reason for why this condition
should hold in general and the transfer function may therefore be non-concave.10
9This expression has an interpretation since ϕ(w∗)+w∗ϕ0(w∗) < 0 implies that d
dw∗(w∗ϕ(w∗)) <
0 which, in turn, means that w∗ϕ(w∗) must be strictly decreasing on the interval [ A
1−δ,∞). In words,
as the tax rate goes up, the value of the marginal loss due to tax avoidance (given by the size of w∗
times the density at this point, ϕ(w∗)) must be increasing in the tax rate for the transfer function





10Indeed, the simulations made in Section 4 show that the transfer function is non-concave for
many parameter conﬁgurations of the model.10
3 Political equilibrium
The tax rate is chosen in a majority vote and a political equilibrium can therefore
be deﬁned as a tax rate, t, with a corresponding level of redistribution, r, given by
equation (6), such that no other tax rate is preferred by a majority of the population.
Even though this formulation covers several voting procedures, the setting consid-
ered here is standard Downsian, two-candidate competition. That is, two parties
(candidates) who only care about winning the election, suggest policies (tax rates),
to which they can commit. Individuals then vote for their favorite candidate (the
one whose policy gives them the highest utility), with a complete understanding of
the consequences of each policy and, ﬁnally, the winning policy is implemented. If,
in this context, there is a policy, t∗, which is majority preferred to all other policies,
both parties will optimally suggest this policy, and both will face an equal chance of
winning the election. Regardless of who wins the election, the policy outcome will
be the political equilibrium tax rate, t∗.
The analysis of individual decisions and the consequences of tax avoidance for
the size of transfers discussed in the previous section, indicate that there is no
simple way of solving for the political equilibrium in general. The fact that the
transfer function is not necessarily concave means that the individual optimization
problem may have multiple solutions, and also that corner solutions may be optimal.
More importantly, individual utility is not necessarily single-peaked, nor is it order
restricted and, hence, none of the standard median voter theorems apply in general.11
The simplest way of seeing under what conditions the median-voter theorems fail is
t oc o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e nt a xa v o i d a n c ei sc o m p l e t e ,i . e .δ =0 , and consider a rich
individual’s changes of utility over the tax rate. As long as the tax rate is so low
that the individual does not optimally invest in tax avoidance, the utility falls as the
tax rate goes up, since the individual’s tax payment is larger than the transfer he
11The restrictions on preferences that give the diﬀerent versions of Median Voter Theorem are
that preferences be either single-peaked (due to Black, 1948) or order-restricted (as in Roberts
(1977). See Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) for a comprehensive treatment of these diﬀerent
median voter theorems.11
receives. Consequently, he would vote against higher taxes in this range. However,
at the point where the individual chooses to invest in tax avoidance, the utility over
t starts to increase (as long as the transfer function r(t) is increasing), due to the
fact that the individual no longer pays any taxes, but does receive the (positive)
transfer. This implies that when the rich individual is faced with two alternatives
in the range of tax rates where he avoids taxes, he will vote as if he had no income
at all, i.e. so as to maximize transfers.
Figure 1 illustrates how individual utility over tax rates changes for three indi-
viduals with diﬀerent income. The left hand panel shows the utility over tax rates
for a low, a middle and a high income individual when tax avoidance is relatively
inexpensive but only leads to small tax reductions. In this situation both the middle
and the high income individual would invest in tax avoidance at diﬀerent points.
The rich individual invests at a relatively low tax rate, t =0 .25 (as can be seen
by the kink in the utility curve) leading to a change in the marginal eﬀect for tax
rates above this point. For the middle income earner it does not pay to invest in
avoidance until the tax rate reaches 95 % (this is hardly detectable in the ﬁgure).
As can be seen from the ﬁgure, utility remains single peaked despite the investments
in avoidance. In contrast, the right hand panel shows a setting where avoidance is
expensive but complete, i.e. when the cost A has been paid the individual no longer
pays any tax. In this case only the richest individual ﬁnds it optimal to invest in
tax avoidance (at t =0 .37), leading his utility to increase as described above. The
decrease in utility for all three individuals for high tax rates is due to the transfer
function r(t) being decreasing due to extensive tax avoidance in the high range of
tax rates.
This does not only mean that the “identity” of the decisive voter may be unknown
(and changing) depending on the tax avoidance parameters but also that there
may be situations when there is no equilibrium. This problem could of course be
addressed by limiting the analysis to situations where the median voter theorem
holds.12 There is, however, no compelling reason for doing so. Instead of limiting











Utility function: log(c), Underlying income distribution: Weibull (0,90,1.8), Representative individuals
have pre-tax income: w=0 (Poor), w=70 (Median), w=275 (Rich, top 1%).











Utility function: log(c), Underlying income distribution: Weibull (0,90,1.8), Representative individuals
have pre-tax income: w=0 (Poor), w=70 (Median), w=275 (Rich, top 1%).
A=10, δ=0.85 A=100, δ=0
Figure 1: Utility over tax rates for three representative individuals. To the left a
setting where tax avoidance inexpensive but ineﬃcient, to the right a case where
avoidance is expensive and complete.
the problem, and possibly leaving out some interesting cases, we develop a simple
and intuitively tractable, numerical method for ﬁnding political equilibria.
The method is based on using local (ﬁrst-order) conditions to ﬁnd tax rates
which are local equilibria. Such equilibria can then be compared to (a dense grid
of) all other tax rates. If a local equilibrium tax rate turns out to be preferred to all
other tax rates by a majority of the population, then it can be concluded that it is
also the global political equilibrium. If, on the other hand, there should be no local
equilibrium which is majority preferred to all other tax rates, it can be concluded
that there is no political equilibrium. The method rests on some results from the
previous section and a few simple theoretical observations.13
First recall that, at any tax rate, the population is, by equation (1), uniquely
preferences remain single peaked. Another possibility would be to consider a simpliﬁed (three-
group) income distribution which would enable a complete analytical solution (as in Fernandez
and Rogerson (1995)).
13The method is very similar to the computational model developed in Epple and Romano
(1996). An important diﬀerence is, however, that the method developed here also ﬁnds corner
solutions which turn out to be important in the context of this paper.13
divided into those avoiding tax and those who do not. The measure of full tax payers,
at any t, is given by Φ(w∗), and that of tax avoiders by 1 − Φ(w∗). Within these
respective groups, individuals have well deﬁned ﬁrst-order conditions for marginal
changes of the tax rate, given by equations (3) and (4). These simply state that a
marginal increase of the tax rate changes an individual’s utility by a term consisting
of the individual’s increased tax payment (given by w or δw depending on whether
the individual avoids tax) and another term, r0(t), which is the change in the size
of the transfer. Clearly, if the marginal increase in transfers is larger than the
marginal increase in the tax payment, an individual would be in favor of such a
marginal change. From this we can conclude the following:
Lemma 1 At any tax rate t, all individuals who pay full taxes (i.e. have an income
w ≤ w∗) and also have an income w<r 0(t), prefer the marginally higher tax rate
t + ε, as compared to t. Among individuals avoiding taxes (i.e. with an income
w>w ∗) everyone with w<r 0(t)/δ also prefers the marginally higher tax rate, t+ε
to t.
Obviously, Lemma 1 does not say anything about the individual’s preferred tax
rate. It just characterizes which individuals favor a marginal change from t to a
marginally higher tax rate t + ε. As will be shown, however, these conditions are
very useful for ﬁnding a global equilibrium policy (if one exists). Using Lemma
1, we can obtain an expression for the share of the population which, at any t,
favors a marginal increase of the tax rate, by simply adding together, everyone who
share a certain marginal preferens. First, deﬁne an income level wf = r0(t) as the
income level at which the ﬁrst-order condition (3) for a full tax payer is fulﬁlled
and, equivalently, deﬁne wa = r0(t)/δ a st h ei n c o m el e v e la tw h i c ht h eﬁrst-order
condition (4) for a tax avoider is fulﬁlled. With these deﬁnitions, we can describe
the aggregate support for a marginal increase of the tax rate by the following:




      
      
Φ(wf)
Φ(wf)+[ Φ(wa) − Φ(w∗)]
Φ(wa)
0
if wf ∈ (0,w ∗] and wa / ∈ (w∗,∞)
if wf ∈ (0,w ∗] and wa ∈ (w∗,∞)
if wf / ∈ (0,w ∗] and wa ∈ (w∗,∞)
if wf / ∈ (0,w ∗] and wa / ∈ (w∗,∞)
. (9)
These four cases have straightforward interpretations. The ﬁrst case, when
H(t)=Φ(wf), is a situation when only the low end of the income distribution
favors an increase of the tax rate, simply because they are the only ones gaining
from higher taxes. Even though a share of the population avoid part of their taxes,
everyone in this group is still a net contributor to the redistributive system (as is the
case when avoidance leads to very small tax reductions, for example, in situations
where δ → 1). In the second case, at least part of those avoiding taxes (those with
an income between Φ(wa) − Φ(w∗)) are also in favor of a marginal increase, due to
t h ef a c tt h a tt h e yn o wr e c e i v em o r et h a nt h e yp a y .T h i si st y p i c a l l yt h ec a s ew h e n
avoidance is eﬃcient (low values of δ). In the limit, as δ → 0, everyone in the richest
fraction of the population (1 − Φ(w∗)) favors a marginal tax increase. In the third
case, everyone who pays full taxes as well as a share of those who avoid taxes favor
an increase of the tax rate while in the fourth and ﬁnal case, no one does (this is
t h ec a s ew h e nr0(t) is negative).14
Figure 2 shows examples of how the population can be split in two diﬀerent
equilibrium situations. The left hand diagram shows a traditional situation where
individuals with low income would like higher taxes compared to the equilibrium,
while the richer half of the population would prefer a lower tax rate, even though
part of the population (those above w∗) avoid taxes. The right hand diagram shows
ad i ﬀerent split, where the rich individuals now instead would prefer a higher tax rate
due to their investments in tax avoidance.Using the function H(t), we can formulate
the following necessary condition for an interior political equilibrium:
14The formulation of H(t) clearly implies that the share of the population opposing a marginal
increase is given by 1 − H(t). The weight of indiﬀerent individuals, as well as those shifting from

































Figure 2: Marginal preferences of diﬀerent segments of the population in two equi-
librium situations. To the left a traditional case, to the right a coalition between
rich and poor, with the rich tax avoiders preferring an increase compared to the
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For a tax rate, t ∈ (0,1), to be a political equilibrium, the share
of the population in favor of a marginal increase must be equal to half the population,
i.e. H(t)=1
2.
Proof. Consider any t ∈ (0,1), such that H(t) < 1
2. Then, there exists a tax rate
t0 <t ,such that more than half the population prefers t0, and hence t0 would gain
more votes than t in a majority vote. Similarly, if H(t) > 1
2, there exists a tax rate
t00 >tsuch that t00 is preferred by more than half the population and, consequently,
t00 would beat t in a majority vote. This means that the only time that t ∈ (0,1)
can be a political equilibrium is when H(t)=1
2.
Note that the proposition is stated for interior solutions, i.e. t ∈ (0,1). Regarding
the possibility of corner solutions, the tax rate t =1is a possible equilibrium if
H(1) ≥ 1
2, while for t =0t ob ea ne q u i l i b r i u m ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tH(0) ≤ 1
2.
The latter is never true when the median is poorer than the mean income earner.
Finally, we can note the following obvious relationship between a local equilib-
rium and a (global) political equilibrium, which deﬁnes a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a political equilibrium in this setting:16
Proposition 2 A (global) political equilibrium is a local equilibrium tax rate,
which is also majority preferred to all other tax rates.
The observations and propositions made above suggest a simple structure for
how to solve the problem of numerically ﬁnding the political equilibrium.
1. Compute w∗(t),r(t) and r0(t) (given by equations (1), (6) and (7)), given
the initial distribution of income Φ(w) and the values of the tax avoidance
parameters, A (cost) and δ (eﬃciency).
2. Use these functions and Lemma 1 to calculate H(t) over all t and ﬁnd points
where H(t)=1
2 (and possibly H(1) ≥ 1
2 ; plotting H(t) gives information on
whether corner solutions need to be considered).
3. Compare local equilibrium points with (a dense grid of) all other tax rates. If
no local equilibrium tax rate is majority preferred to all other tax rates, we
can conclude that no political equilibrium exists. But ,as stated in Proposition
2, if a local equilibrium is majority preferred to all other tax rates, it is the
political equilibrium.
4S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
Using the method outlined in the previous section, the model can be solved for any
(continuous and well-behaved) initial income distribution, and any combination of
tax avoidance parameters. Obviously, some parameter values are more interesting
than others, in that they capture real-world aspects of the problem. As will be shown
in Section 4.1, the solutions turn out to have certain monotonicity characteristics
which enable a division of the outcomes into two broad classes of interest, deﬁned by
the type of tax avoidance activity studied: equilibria when tax avoidance is cheap
and ineﬃcient (“standard” tax planning) and equilibria when avoidance is expensive
and eﬃcient (“advanced” tax avoidance). In Section 4.2 the eﬀect of having both
these opportunities available simultaneously is studied.17
4.1 Political equilibria with tax avoidance
Even though we may have a some idea of the kinds of tax avoidance activities for
which the parameters are approximations, their exact size is obviously unobservable.
Equilibria will, therefore, be computed for a range of reasonable parameters. In all
cases, the (pre-tax) income is assumed to be Weibull distributed with parameter
values chosen so as to approximate actual distributions of market income.15 Fig-
ure 3 shows the span of diﬀerent income distributions used, with the benchmark
distribution in bold.16


















Figure 3: Distributions of initial income based on the Weibull distribution.
The political equilibrium tax rates for the benchmark distribution and a range
of tax avoidance parameters are shown in Figure 4. The monotonicity of the equi-
librium outcomes enables us to characterize four types of outcomes, each with an
intuitive explanation.
There are two types of extreme outcomes. Starting in the upper left-hand corner
we have cases where tax avoidance is both expensive and ineﬃcient. For example, the





values of a and b determine the lower end and the scale of the support, respectively. These values
are kept ﬁxed with a =0and b =9 0 , while c varies between 1.1 (low concentration, i.e. high income
inequality) and 2.2 (high concentration, that is low income inequality) with 1.5 as the benchmark.
In terms of Gini-coeﬃcients, this means varying the distribution between approximately 0.5 and
0.25, which should cover most actual distributions.
16The benchmark has a Gini coeﬃcient of 39.3. A simple average of market income for all
countries included in the OECD Economic Studies, No. 29, 1997/II report, and the Luxembourg
Income Study (reported in OECD Social Policy Studies No. 18, 1995) is 39.5.18
parameter combination A =1 0 0 ,δ=0 .9, means that at a cost equal to the average
income in the economy an individual can get a 10 % tax reduction. Even for high
tax rates, this is attractive only to very few individuals and hence, the loss of tax
base from increased taxation is small, resulting in that a majority of the population
would, in such a situation, favor a tax rate of 100%. The opposite extreme is found
in the lower right-hand corner. Here avoiding taxes is instead relatively cheap and
very eﬀective. When tax avoidance opportunities are, for example, characterized by
A =1 0and δ =0anyone can avoid taxes completely at a cost of only 10% of the
average income. This leads to a situation where higher tax rates would be associated
with so much avoidance activity that the equilibrium ends up being a tax rate of
only 3 %.
Cost of tax avoidance (A) Share of taxes paid (δ)
(in % of average income) 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0
100 1 1 0.65 0.38 0.33 0.29
50 1 0.92 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.15
20 1 0.45 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06
10 1 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03

























































The equilibrium tax rate drops as avoidance becomes more effective
Cost of tax avoidance (A) Share of taxes paid (δ)
(in % of average income) 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0
100 1 1 0.65 0.38 0.33 0.29
50 1 0.92 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.15
20 1 0.45 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06
10 1 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03

























































The equilibrium tax rate drops as avoidance becomes more effective
Cost of tax avoidance (A) Share of taxes paid (δ)
(in % of average income) 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0
100 1 1 0.65 0.38 0.33 0.29
50 1 0.92 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.15
20 1 0.45 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06
10 1 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03
Initial income distribution: Weibull (0,90,1.5), Pre-tax Gini coefficient: 0.39
Cost of tax avoidance (A) Share of taxes paid (δ)
(in % of average income) 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0
100 1 1 0.65 0.38 0.33 0.29
50 1 0.92 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.15
20 1 0.45 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06
10 1 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03

























































The equilibrium tax rate drops as avoidance becomes more effective
Figure 4: Equilibrium tax rates for diﬀerent combinations of costs and shares
avoided. The underlined ﬁgures are equilibria where a coalition of rich and poor
would prefer an increase of the tax and the median income earner is not decisive.
T h ei n t e r m e d i a t ea n dm o r er e a l i s t i co u t c o m e so c c u rw h e nt h et a xa v o i d a n c ei s
characterized by, what is arguably more realistic tax avoidance parameters.
In the lower left-hand part of the table, we have combinations of low cost and
low eﬀectiveness also yield intermediate tax rates.17 These parameter combinations
17It is worth emphasizing the context in which the expresion "low eﬀectiveness" is used. In many
cases, tax reductions of twenty percent are not small, nor easily achieved, but in this setting, they
are “small” when contrasted to “advanced”, complete tax avoidance.19
correspond to activities such as buying standard legal advice in some form. To
exemplify, if individuals by spending the equivalent of 10 to 20 percent of the average
income can reduce their tax burden by 20 percent, the resulting equilibrium tax rates
would be between 25 and 45 percent. In these situations the equilibrium number
of individuals who would choose to invest in tax avoidance is around 10 percent
of the population. Politically, these cases are characterized by the lower half of
the income distribution being in favor of a higher tax rate and, consequently, more
redistribution, while the richer half would prefer a lower tax rate. This means that
the median income earner is the decisive voter in all these cases.
Finally, in the top right-hand corner avoidance is very costly but also very ef-
fective. It takes a large investment, but once that has been made, the actual tax
rate faced by a wealthy individual can be brought close to zero. This characteri-
zation is not unlike a description of existing advanced tax planning schemes using
tax haves, or other tax shelters. An interesting aspect of these equilibria is that the
fraction of the population that in equilibrium invests in tax avoidance is relatively
small (around 0.5 percent). This indicates that it is not necessarily the number of
individuals engaged in avoidance which measures its importance. What holds taxes
down in these situations is the tax avoidance possibility. T h a ti s ,t h et h r e a tt h a t
a ni n c r e a s ei nt h et a xr a t ew o u l dl e a dt os u c ha ni n c r e a s eo ft a xa v o i d a n c em a k i n g
the decisive voter prefer to hold the tax rate down. Politically, these cases are in-
teresting since the median voter is not decisive in any of the underlined equilibria.
When avoidance is complete, the proponents for a marginally higher tax rate are,
in equilibrium, composed of both ends of the distribution.
Even though it is a theoretical possibility, no cases of multiple equilibria, nor
cases of nonexistence of equilibria were found in the simulations. The qualitative
results are not aﬀected by changing the underlying distribution. The size of the
equilibrium tax rate does, however, change slightly depending on the pre-tax income
distribution.18
18The model has been solved for a number of pre-tax income distributions with Gini coeﬃcients
in the range 0.30 to 0.49 and the qualitative results remain the same.20
4.2 Equilibria with both standard and advanced avoidance
opportunities
In reality, it seems likely that both advanced, as well as less advanced, tax avoidance
schemes are simultaneously available to people. This fact can easily be incorporated
into the model. We now study situations where individuals can choose whether to
invest in cheap, but less eﬀective, tax avoidance, expensive and eﬃcient avoidance,
o rn o ti n v e s ti nt a xa v o i d a n c ea ta l l . T ob es p e c i ﬁc, the induced utility function,
previously given by equation (2), is now
v(w,t)=m a x

   
   
u(w − tw + r)
u(w − A1 − δ1tw + r)
u(w − A2 − δ2tw + r)
if w ≤ w∗1
if w∗1 <w≤ w∗2
if w > w∗2
,
where parameters (A1,δ1) characterize simple tax avoidance, while (A2,δ2) are the
parameter values for the advanced avoidance scheme. At any tax rate, individuals
with an income below w∗1 = A1/(1− δ1)t do not avoid taxes at all, those with
an income above w∗1, but below w∗2 = A2/(1− δ2)t, c h o o s et h es i m p l ea v o i d a n c e
s c h e m e ,w h i l et h o s ew i t ha ni n c o m ea b o v ew∗2 invest in the advanced avoidance












Even though solving for the political equilibrium involves a few additional steps,
the method is precisely the same as in the cases with only one form of avoidance
available at a time.
Table 1 shows the political equilibrium tax rates, t∗, for cases where the simple
tax avoidance scheme is ﬁxed (at diﬀerent values for each column) while the cost of
completely avoiding taxes is varied (vertically). As in the previous section the cost
of tax avoidance is given as a percentage of average income and the underlying pre-
19In situations where w∗2 <w ∗1, clearly no one uses the simple tax avoidance scheme. Such a
case is analogous in outcome to situations where only the advanced scheme is available.21
tax income distribution is Weibull(0,90,1.5) with a Gini-coeﬃcient of approximately
0.39. The cost of small scale tax planning is set to be between 6 and 25 percent of
the average income, while the tax reductions to which this leads, vary from 10 to 30
percent. The cost of complete avoidance varies between 60 percent of the average
income and 2.5 times the average income.
Cost (A2) for Cost of regular avoidance (A)f o rd i ﬀerent tax shares (δ)
δ2=0 δ =0 .9 δ =0 .8 δ =0 .7
61 2 2 561 22 561 22 5
250 0.54 0.63 0.72 0.14 0.27 0.53 0.08 0.16 0.31
190 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.14 0.27 0.47 0.08 0.16 0.31
150 0.36 0.42 0.43 0.14 0.27 0.41 0.08 0.16 0.30
120 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.14 0.27 0.36 0.08 0.16 0.30
100 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.27 0.29 0.08 0.16 0.27
60 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.18
Initial income distribution: Weibull (0,90,1.5), pre-tax Gini coeﬃcient = 0.393
Average income = 81.46 , Median income = 70.42
Table 1: Equilibrium tax rates with both regular and advanced avoidance
The simultaneous availability of both small-scale and advanced tax avoidance has
a downward, enveloping eﬀect on the equilibrium tax rate. The downward pressure
on the tax rate is easily understood. Whereas an increase of the tax rate previously
lead to a marginal loss of tax base at one level in the income distribution, the
decisive voter must now take into account both the marginal loss at the very top of
the distribution (additional complete avoidance) as well as the increase in “standard”
avoidance. The enveloping eﬀect comes from that either one of these eﬀects can be
more or less severe for the decisive voter. For example, if the biggest marginal loss
of tax base, from an increase of the tax rate, comes from more individuals investing
in standard tax avoidance, preventing this (by keeping the tax rate low) becomes
most important. Regardless of increases in the cost of complete avoidance, the tax22
rate remains low. An example of this is the case when, A =6and δ =0 .8, and
the equilibrium tax remains 0.14 regardless of the cost (A2) of complete avoidance
changing. The opposite can, of course also happen. When A2=6 0it does not
matter what the cost of standard avoidance (δ =0 .9) is, the equilibrium remains
0.18.
Regarding the number of individuals investing in tax avoidance, typical equilib-
rium shares lie between 5 and 15 percent for standard tax avoidance, and between
0.1 and 0.5 percent for complete avoidance. The share of total income lost due to
tax avoidance ranges from 0.5 to 6 percent for the equilibria shown in Table 1.
5 Confronting the model with data
Confronting the model with data is diﬃcult for two reasons. First, the level of
abstraction is such that it is not possible to ﬁnd exact real-world counterparts to
the variables. There is, for example, no obvious analogue to the tax rate determined
by majority vote in the model. Second, there are no direct estimates of the tax
avoidance parameters. Still, there are ways of comparing the model predictions
with real-world observations.
Figure 5 illustrates the basic structure of the model outlined and solved in the
previous sections. Given a pre-tax distribution of income and assuming common-
knowledge of the cost and eﬀectiveness of the tax avoidance opportunities there is, as
was shown in the previous section, a unique equilibrium tax rate, with corresponding
levels of avoidance activities and redistribution.
Out of the data needed to test the model, there are relatively good estimates
o f( p r e - t a x )m a r k e ti n c o m e( a sd e ﬁned in the Luxembourg Income Study, hence-
f o r t hL I S ) ,b u to n l ys o m ec o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc, indirect data on the eﬀectiveness of tax
avoidance and no data on the cost of avoidance. However, using the data which is
available and the fact that there is a unique t∗ for every cost of avoidance (given the
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Figure 5: The input- and output components of the model and their respective
proxies.
To exemplify, consider the case of Sweden in 1980 for which there is data on
market income as well as a study of tax avoidance activities in that year. The
distribution of market-income in Sweden 1980 had, according to the LIS estimate, a
pre-tax Gini coeﬃcient of 0.41. Setting the dispersion parameter (c) in the Weibull
distribution (0,90,c) to c =0 .4, gives a pre-tax Gini coeﬃcient of 0.41 in the model.
Furthermore, according to a study of tax avoidance by Malmer and Persson (1994),
individuals in the top decile managed to avoid about 20% of their oﬃcial tax burden
in 1980, while the rest of the population avoided virtually nothing. This suggests
setting δ =0 .8, which means precisely that an investment in tax avoidance reduces
the tax payment by 20 %. There is no information on the cost of tax avoidance (A).
However, since there is a monotone relationship between A and the equilibrium tax
rate t∗ for a given δ,w ec a nu s eap r o x yo ft∗ to close the model. Using the total
tax revenue as a share of GDP, which was 49% in 1980, as a proxy of the tax rate
t∗ implies that if the model is to match this, the cost of tax avoidance must be set
to A =2 2(expressed in percent of average income). This does not seem to be an
unreasonable cost for avoiding 20 % of taxes.
Even though data on the equilibrium tax rate must be used to close the model,
there remains three results which can be compared to other data (whenever avail-24
able): the distribution of disposable income, the amount of taxes avoided, and the
number of individuals who, in equilibrium, invest in tax avoidance. For the case
of Sweden 1980, the LIS has data on the distribution of disposable income and
the study by Malmer and Persson (1994) contains information suggesting that the
richest 10 % of the population avoided taxes.
Table 2 shows the model’s predicted measures of disposable income and the
number of individuals who invest in tax avoidance. The predictions for income
inequality come surprisingly close to the observed measures. Out of the 21-point
drop in the Gini coeﬃcient, 19 points can be explained by the model’s proportional
tax scheme. Furthermore, the model’s equilibrium prediction regarding the share
of the population who avoid taxes is 9%, which corresponds well to the observed
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%o fG D P
Estim. share
of avoiders P90/P10 P90/P50 P80/P20 Gini
Estimates
δ=0.8,A (n.a) 0.41 49 10% 2.43 1.51 1.76 0.197
Table 2: Testing the model on data for Sweden 1980
Another case for which there is data is Denmark in 1995. As in the above case,
we start by approximating the distribution of initial income. Setting c =1 .41 gives
a pre-tax income distibution with the same Gini-coeﬃcient as that reported by LIS
for Denmark 1995. There are no observations on the tax avoidance parameters, but
assuming that δ =0 .8 (as in the case of Sweden) we can again close the model
by setting A so as to get an equilibrium tax rate in the model, that matches the
o b s e r v e dt a xr e v e n u ea sas h a r eo fG D P( w h i c hi s4 9 % ) .S o l v i n gt h em o d e lw i t ha25
pre-tax distribution with Gini equal to 0.42 and tax avoidance parameters δ =0 .8
and A =2 0 , gives an equilibrium tax rate of 49 % (this we know since we used
this in the calibration), and predictions on the distribution of after-tax disposable
income, on the number of individuals who avoid taxes, and on the amount of money
being avoided. As before, the predictions on disposable income can be compared to
estimates in the LIS, while a study by Nielsen et al. (2001) estimate that 4.1% of
t h eD a n i s hi n c o m e - t a xb a s et h a ty e a rw e r el o s td u et oi n t e r n a t i o n a li n c o m es h i f t i n g .
This ﬁgure can be compared to the predicted amount of money which is not taxed
in the model due to tax avoidance. Table 3 reports these comparisons.20 Again, the
measures of disposable income are relatively close to the observations and the share
of total income lost due to avoidance turns out to be 4.6%, which is also close to







avoided P90/P10 P90/P50 P80/P20 Gini
Model








%o fG D P
Estim share of
inc. avoided P90/P10 P90/P50 P80/P20 Gini
Estimates
δ=?, A=? 0.42 49 4.1% 3.18 1.63 2.19 0.263
Table 3: Testing the model on data for Denmark 1995
Besides data on market income, disposable income and tax rates, the above
examples rely on additional information about tax avoidance. Even though such
data is scarce, the studies that do exist can give indications about the range of
plausible avoidance parameters for other countries. Very broadly, they studies seem
to suggest the following: individuals in the top income decile can avoid taxes in an
20The small diﬀerences compared to the Swedish example above are due to the diﬀerent pre-tax
income distribution.
21The estimated share of total income missing is 6% in 1996 and 4.6% in 1997.26
order of magnitude of about 10-20%.22 Those in the top income percentile seem to
have even larger possibilities to avoid taxes and some can probably even completely
avoid taxes.23 As mentioned above, measures of aggregate avoidance activity suggest
that approximately 2-6% of the income tax base is diverted from taxation.
Table 4 shows the political equilibrium tax rate (t∗), the share of total income
avoided and the resulting measures of disposable income inequality for a range of
plausible parameterizations. (The choice of initial income distribution is set so as
to approximate the average pre-tax Gini coeﬃcient for all available observations
reported in LIS.24 The average values of the model predictions can be compared
to the average values of their corresponding measures taken from recent studies of
income inequality).25
The results are very surprising. When solving the model for a reasonable range
of tax avoidance parameters, given an initial income distribution with the same Gini
coeﬃcient as that of average actual market income, the resulting measures of income
inequality are, on average, very close to their corresponding average measures in the
data. It is also worth emphasizing that these results are political equilibria, that is,
the results of majority preferred tax and transfer schemes, given the possibilities to
avoid taxes.
A natural question is, of course, if this is just a lucky coincidence for the average
values of income inequality. A check of this can be made by dividing the data into
22Based on Malmer and Persson (1994) and Lang et al. (1997), taking into account that these
s t u d i e sa r eb a s e do nd a t af r o mh i g ht a xs i t u a t i o n s . A v o i d a n c ec a nb ee x p e c t e dt ob eh i g h e ri n
these cases than on average.
23Malmer and Persson (1994) estimate that one tenth of the individuals in the top decile reduced
their taxes by half.
24Data for market income Gini is taken from OECD Economic Review No. 29, 1997 and OECD
Social Policy Studies No. 18, 1995 (based on LIS) and consists of 34 observations, with an average
market income Gini of 0.39.
25Data is taken from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997),
( w h i c hi sa l s ob a s e do nL I S ) ,a n df r o mﬁgures reported in OECD Economic Review No. 29, 1997/II.
All averages used are simple, (non-weighted), averages of all observations reported in the sources
(LIS data is taken from the latest Key Figures and from OECD Social Policy Studies No. 18,
1995. When “all countries, all years” are included, this means 26 OECD countries for the years
ranging from 1969 to 1997, with a total of 97 (country/year) observations. When only the “most
recent years” are included, this means 25 OECD countries between 1994 and 1997. (Note that
when calculating the average, the most recent years are not included since they are already in the
ﬁgures for all observations).27
Model Predictions
Parameters (A,δ) Income Inequality Measures
Fix A1=6, δ1=0.9
vary A2 for δ2=0 t∗ Income share
avoided P90/P10 P90/P 50 P80/P 20 Gini
200 0.45 0.040 2.80 1.69 1.97 0.246
150 0.36 0.023 3.27 1.80 2.20 0.275
100 0.27 0.012 3.94 1.91 2.50 0.304
Average 0.36 0.025 3.34 1.80 2.22 0.275
Fix A1=12, δ1=0.8
vary A2 for δ2=0 t∗ Income share
avoided P90/P10 P90/P 50 P80/P 20 Gini
200 0.27 0.014 4.01 1.92 2.50 0.305
150 0.27 0.015 4.01 1.92 2.50 0.305
100 0.24 0.009 4.27 1.95 2.67 0.314
Average 0.26 0.013 4.10 1.93 2.56 0.308
Average (model) 0.31 0.019 3.72 1.87 2.39 0.292
Data
Source of data Income Inequality Measures
t∗ Income share
avoided P90/P10 P90/P 50 P80/P 20 Gini
LIS (all years) 0.32 - 4.00 1.89 2.41 0.288
LIS (recent years) 0.36 - 4.19 1.93 2.46 0.298
G & S (JEL, 97) 0.38 - 3.52 n.a. n.a. 0.274
Average (data) 0.32a 0.02-0.06b 3.76 1.89 2.41 0.286
Calculations are based on a pre-tax income distribution: Weibull (0,90,1.5), with a Gini coeﬃcient = 0.39
Actual average market income Gini coeﬃcient = 0.39 (average of the values reported in the data sources)
a: Measured as total tax revenue as percentage of GDP, unweighted average for all countries in LIS for the
years 1965-1995, which is the same time span as for the LIS inequality measures, (Source: OECD).
b: Based on estimates by Gordon and Nielsen (1997), Nielsen et al. (2001) (for Denmark), Löfvist(2001)
(for Sweden), Lang et al. (1997) for Germany, and by the IRS (for USA), (see Andreoni et al. (1998)).
Table 4: Comparison of average model-outcomes for diﬀerent tax-avoidance para-
meters and pre-tax Gini of 0.39, and average values of observed data28
two groups, one with the most unequal observations of market income distribution,
and one with the most equal observations.26
Unequal market income Income Inequality Measures
Model pre-tax income Gini = 0.346
Average market income Gini = 0349 tP 90/P 10 P90/P 50 P80/P 20 Gini
Average (model) 0.30 4.84 2.18 2.90 0.327
Average (data) 0.39 3.77 1.84 2.35 0.284
Average (US & UK only) 0.30 5.11 2.04 2.89 0.331
Equal market income Income Inequality Measures
Model pre-tax income Gini = 0.346
Average market income Gini = 0349 tP 90/P 10 P90/P 50 P80/P 20 Gini
Average (model) 0.37 3.30 1.70 2.20 0.263
Average (data) 0.28 3.30 1.74 2.17 0.256
Table 5: The same comparison as in Table 7 but with the sample divided into
"equal" and "unequal" countries
The average market income Gini coeﬃcient for the unequal observations is 0.443,
and for the most equal observations, 0.349. In Table 5, the average values of in-
equality measures for these groups are compared to the model predictions. The
equilibria are computed for the same tax avoidance parameters as those used in
Table 4, and assuming initial distributions of pre-tax income that approximate the
groups of unequal and equal market income, respectively.27
Again, the outcome of the model is relatively close to observed data, with the
exception of the unequal economies when all countries are included. The reason is
that some countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, have high market income Gini
coeﬃcients (around 0.44), but very low levels of disposable income Gini coeﬃcients
(around 0.23), which pull down the average considerably. When, for example, only
26There are 34 observations of market income, and the bases for the split of countries is a simple
division into the 17 most equal, and the 17 least equal, observations.
27An initial income distribution which is Weibull (0,90,1.2) has a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.449. This
is chosen as an approximation of the average for “unequal” countries. Changing the distribution to
Weibull (0,90,1.8) gives a distribution with a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.346, which is taken to approximate
the average of “equal” countries.29
considering data for the U.S. and the U.K., the predictions of the model are much
closer.
Overall, the model seems to be consistent with the data, for the range of tax
avoidance parameters considered above. Measures of disposable income inequality,
as well as estimates on how much money is being avoided, can be closely matched for
single countries where partial data on tax avoidance is available. Taking the average
for a range of plausible avoidance parameters also gives predictions matching the
corresponding measures for a whole group of countries, both on average, and for
countries with equal and unequal pre-tax income distributions considered separately.
Clearly, these results should be interpreted with caution given the crudeness of the
measures used.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
This paper set out to study the redistributive as well as the political eﬀects of
introducing tax avoidance in a setting where the tax rate is determined in a majority
election. In the introduction, three questions were raised which can now be answered.
The ﬁrst question concerned the possibilities to tax individuals and redistribute
income. Taken literally, the model developed in this paper suggests that the very
richest part of the population will always, in equilibrium, invest in tax avoidance.
As a consequence, everyone above a critical income level, will pay a smaller share
of their income in taxes compared to the rest of the population, even if the oﬃcial
tax rate is proportional. In situations where it is possible to completely avoid taxes,
the very richest part of the population is not aﬀected by increased taxation. It is
interesting to note that these features could, in an explicitly dynamic context, enable
high levels of redistributive taxes “without impeding the investments by the rich”
(Saint-Paul and Verdier, (1996), p. 726). This could, in turn, change the analysis of
how inequality aﬀects growth (see e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994a). The model also shows how the tax avoidance possibilities create
at r a d e - o ﬀ between taxation and the tax base. Increasing the tax rate leads, on the30
one hand, to larger tax payments from those who pay the tax but, on the other hand,
it also induces a larger share of the population to invest in tax avoidance and, hence,
decreases the tax base. For reasonable parameters, the tax avoidance opportunities
limit the demand for complete equalization of income, and the equilibrium tax rate
chosen by a majority is smaller than one.
Closely linked to these observations is the second question in the introduction,
concerning the eﬀects on the distribution of disposable income. For reasonable
parameterizations of the model, 5-20% of the population avoid 10-20% of their oﬃcial
tax payments and a very small fraction — less than 0.5% — completely avoids taxes.
These observations are consistent with studies on tax avoidance activities.
The third question posed in the introduction dealt with the potential political
eﬀects of the introduction of tax avoidance. These are perhaps the most interesting.
Even though it is obvious that individuals with a higher than average income never
beneﬁt from positive taxes in a purely redistributive setting, they may prefer a
higher tax rate than that preferred by the median income earner. This, in turn,
means that the median income earner is not necessarily the decisive voter. Instead,
in equilibrium, a coalition of the poor and the very rich may favor an increase of the
tax rate. In a situation where complete tax avoidance possibilities are available, this
type of coalition is always the equilibrium outcome, and the tax rate is higher than
that preferred by the median income earner. Such a situation can be described as an
inverse of Director’s law, with redistribution going from the middle towards the ends
of the income distribution. Allowing for a broader interpretation of tax avoidance,
the investments made by the rich could also be seen as political contributions in
exchange for “tailored tax cuts”, creating an endogenous wealth-biased political
mechanism (see e.g. Bénabou (2000)).
Quantitatively, the predictions of the model depend on the tax avoidance para-
meters and the choice of the initial income distribution. When choosing a reasonable
range of parameter values, based on observable tax rates and estimates of total in-
come tax avoidance, the equilibrium tax rate is, on average, around 30 percent,31
between one and six percent of total income disappear from the redistributive sys-
tem due to tax avoidance, and the Gini coeﬃcient drops by 10 to 15 points as a
consequence of taxes and transfers. Between 5 and 20 percent of the population
engage in small scale tax avoidance, which means that they reduce their oﬃcial tax
payment by 10 to 20 percent, while a very small share of the population makes costly
investments in tax avoidance to completely avoid taxation.
When comparing the model predictions for income inequality to actual obser-
vations, they turn out to be surprisingly close, both on average and for groups of
countries, as well as for single countries. Even though such comparisons should be
interpreted with care, they seem to suggest that, despite the simplicity of the model,
it does seem to capture important aspects of reality.32
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